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Abstract  
A wide variety of farm household models have provided a valuable theoretical basis for empirical and 
conceptual analysis of interactions between production and consumption resource allocations of poor 
rural people. A weakness of common applications of many such models, and unfortunately of much 
analysis, is failure to routinely also recognise and adequately describe the fundamental seasonal 
nature of most agricultural production and the effects of pervasive seasonal finance market failures on 
poor rural people’s behaviour and welfare. This is despite considerable theoretical work 
demonstrating the importance of seasonal financial market failures as constraints on agricultural 
development. A general model recognising this is presented, with graphical applications showing the 
potential importance of seasonal finance constraints on farm households’ behaviour and welfare .  
Formal methods for allowing for the effects of seasonal finance constraints on household responses to 
policy and other change should be standard tools used by applied rural development economists.  
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Conceptualising the effects of seasonal financial market failures and credit rationing in applied rural 
household models 
Andrew Dorward 
1. Introduction 
Household models have played a significant role in advancing theoretical understanding and empirical 
analysis of the behaviour of (particularly poorer) rural people and economies.  Their specific 
contribution lies in the modeling of two key features of (again poorer) smallholder people's 
livelihoods:  the interactions between production and consumption decisions, and the effects of 
market failures in labour, product and credit markets upon these interactions. The models by and large 
successfully allow for these important features of farm households and for differences between 
households with different resource endowments and objectives. Many have, however, in both their 
conceptualisation and operationalisation, largely ignored another key feature of poor smallholders' 
livelihoods: the critical importance of seasonality in agricultural production leading, with poverty, to 
seasonality in market failures, notably in credit markets, and hence credit rationing.  This has been 
associated with an unfortunate lack of attention in much empirical and policy analysis to the effects of 
seasonality on poor farm household behaviour. Seasonality is, however, a major feature of rainfed 
agriculture and plays a significant part in perpetuating poverty. This paper uses a relatively simple 
model formulation to address this and discusses a simple conceptual application of the model. 
Following this introduction the paper provides a brief review of farm household model development 
and application. This leads on to a discussion of the importance and extent of seasonal credit market 
failures and credit rationing  in smallholder agriculture and then the specification of a formal farm 
household model allowing for seasonal credit market failures and credit rationing . Insights from and 
benefits from the wider use of this model as compared with current standard models are 
demonstrated with relatively simple graphical application of the model to describe the situations of 
households affected by credit rationing. It then goes on to compare the effects of changes in prices, 
wages, and technology on affected and unaffected households. Significant differences from 
(improvements over) predictions of the standard model are shown for (generally poorer) households 
affected by credit rationing.  
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2. Farm household models 
A wide variety of farm household models have provided a valuable theoretical basis for empirical and 
conceptual analysis of interactions between production and consumption resource allocations of poor 
rural people. Building on standard production economics and early 20
th
 century analysis by Chayanov 
of peasant agriculture in Russia (Ellis (1993)), farm household models developed by Nakajima (1986) 
and by Barnum and Squire  (Barnum and Squire (1979))  have been widely used to develop theoretical 
understanding of peasant farm households (by investigating theoretical properties of and inferences 
from these models) and for empirical investigation of the effects of different technical, market and 
policy changes on different peasant farm households’ behaviour, welfare and interactions with 
produce and factor markets. Such models have been given significant attention by postgraduate 
agricultural and rural development text books such as Singh et al. (1986); Ellis (1993); Bardhan and 
Udry (1999) and Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995). Taylor and Adelman (2003) review these models with 
the explicit objective of providing a starting point for students and researchers to build models to 
investigate impacts of policy and market changes.  
A limitation of the models presented in much of this literature (which both describes and influences 
theoretical and empirical work), is lack of integrated analysis of on the one hand simultaneous 
production and consumption decisions (the focus of farm household models) with, on the other hand, 
the behavioural effects of seasonal capital constraints
1
.   Singh et al. (1986) includes no discussion of 
seasonal credit constraints or examples of models addressing this, although Iqbal (1986) allows for 
inter-year borrowing and saving.  Ellis (1993) makes no mention of credit market failures in his 
chapters on farm household models. Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995, 164 ff) include discussion of a 
related literature that considers the effects of liquidity constraints on intertemporal household models 
looking at life-cycle, inter year liquidity constraints (rather than intra-year liquidity constraints). 
Bardhan and Udry (1999), in a chapter on household models discuss only land and labour market 
failures (not credit market failures) and in a subsequent chapter on credit markets explore credit 
market failures in terms of information economics, without reference to their impacts on household 
                                                          
1
 There are of course other weaknesses with the farm household models, most importantly their failure to 
describe the nature and effects of intra-household relations and their limited ability to describe market linkage 
equilibrium effects. These issues are, however, widely recognised by analysts and in the text books discussed 
earlier, and a range of formal models have been developed to address these issues - see for example McElroy 
and Horney (1981), Smith (1998), Quinsumbing (2003) and Seebens and Sauer (2007) on intra-household 
relations and Taylor and Adelman (2003) on market linkage effects.   
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behaviour. Taylor and Adelman (2003) mention a small literature on household models showing or 
describing credit market failures, but make no mention of seasonality, and do not consider credit 
market failures in further discussion of the application, development or weaknesses of models. de 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) draw attention to the impact of seasonal financial failures on farm 
household behaviour, and suggest that treatment of this in a static annual model can provide valuable 
insights into the way that farm household behaviour can be constrained by seasonal liquidity 
constraints. Their conclusion, however, is that policies for agricultural production must be 
complemented by policies promoting working capital by improving access to both credit and savings 
opportunities  
Financial market failures (including in some cases seasonal market failures) are examined in a 
literature that explores and demonstrates the existence of credit rationing and constraints and their 
impacts on farm productivity and household welfare (see for example Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), 
Carter and Wiebe (1990), Feder et al. (1990), Carter and Olinto (2003), Carter and F.J. (2000) and 
Boucher et al. (2008), with reviews in Petrick, M. (2005) and Boucher et al. (2009)). Important and 
valuable though these studies are in highlighting the extent of credit rationing and its impacts on 
productivity and welfare, there has been little follow up outside this literature in studies not 
specifically concerned with credit per se. , for example in studies of the effects of price changes or new 
technologies on farm household behaviour and welfare.  Thus although Skoufias (1993) and De Janvry 
et al. (1992) do describe models that allow for seasonal (intra-year) credit constraints affecting 
production and consumption decisions within and between seasons, this approach is rarely cited or 
followed in studies of the impacts of changes in other variables (for example input or output prices or 
technology):  the wider impacts of seasonal finance constraints on farm household responses to such 
change are therefore often forgotten. Recommendations tend to be made about improving access to 
seasonal financial markets, not about taking the failures of these markets into account when 
developing other policies and analysing their effects on farm household behaviour and welfare.  
3. Seasonal credit market failures 
The particular seasonal nature of much agricultural production (particularly rainfed crop production) is 
one of the characteristics of agriculture that have traditionally set it apart from other industries or 
sectors, even in wealthier economies where agriculture is a relatively unimportant part of the 
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economy
2
. The effects of this on farm household and sectoral behaviour and welfare are particularly 
severe among poorer farm households living in poorer rural areas. Such households face greater 
seasonal constraints from shortages in working capital, must use such working capital for both 
consumption and production, and face particular difficulties in accessing seasonal finance markets – 
but  seasonality, poverty and reliance on low productivity agriculture are inherent and mutually 
reinforcing features of many poor rural economies (see for example Newberry and Stiglitz (1981), 
Feder et al. (1985), Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986), Binswanger and McIntire (1987), Dorward 
(1996), Dorward (2006), and papers referenced above on credit rationing ).   
The difficulties facing poor rural households from interactions of consumption and production 
objectives and activities in the context of seasonality and financial market failures have been 
recognised in a long standing literature on seasonality and, for example, hungry gaps (periods of 
particular difficulty for poor rural households with low food stocks, high demands for labour and other 
crop production investment, high risks of illness, and adverse wage rates and food and asset prices).  
Much of this literature has been descriptive, focussing on identification and description of seasonal 
constraints affecting different types of rural households and their responses to these constraints 
Chambers et al. (1981), Longhurst (1986), Corbett (1989), Davies (1989), Gill (1991), Ellis (2000)). As 
noted earlier, a significant literature has explored non-separability in farm household models as a 
result of credit rationing and demonstrated that credit rationing is a significant issue affecting farm 
productivity and welfare for many poor smallholder farmers.  A separate  branch of modelling has 
involved the construction of linear and non-linear programming  models for specific farm systems 
rather  than the estimation of more generalisable econometric models (see for example Holden 
(1993), Dorward (1996), Alwang and Siegel (1999), Dorward (1999), Dorward (2006)). These studies 
have not generally examined the impacts of seasonal finance constraints as their primary focus of 
interest, but have modelled their effects as one critical element in the wider set of constraints on poor 
                                                          
2
 Other features of agriculture that set it apart from other sectors are the relatively inelastic demand for many 
agricultural (particularly food) products; the particular importance of food to human consumption; the dispersed 
nature of crop production; agriculture’s dependence and effects on renewable natural resources ; and, in poor 
agricultural economies, the large proportion of employment and GDP associated with agriculture (particularly in 
rural areas where poverty incidence and severity tend to be highest); the integration of consumption and 
production in subsistence and (more commonly) semi-subsistence farm households; and financial (savings, credit 
and insurance) market failures (particularly in poorer areas and among poorer households predominantly 
producing food crops).   
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rural people’s welfare and behaviour
3
. A related literature has explored (with more qualitative 
approaches) the extent and effects of seasonal poverty traps (Chambers (1983)) while quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of more general asset poverty traps has been associated with resurgent interest  in 
risk, uncertainty, vulnerability and social protection (for example  Carter and Barrett (2006), Carter and 
Barrett (2007), Barnett et al. (2008)).  
It appears then that the lack of explicit attention to problems arising from seasonal finance market 
failures represents a critical flaw in the general application of agricultural household models to analysis 
of poor rural people’s livelihoods. First, models’ focus on household achievement of consumption 
requirements from own production is generally concerned only with future consumption (in the 
harvest, post harvest and subsequent pre-harvest seasons), not with consumption for current survival 
(in the immediate pre-harvest season) - but current survival is a major pre-occupation of poor rural 
people that can compromise their ability to invest in future production. Second, common conflation of 
income from crop production at or after harvest with pre- harvest income and expenditure associated 
with buying and selling of labour fails to describe capital constraints on livelihood options. These 
failings are not merely academic and conceptual: seasonal finance constraints restrict poor people’s 
options so that analytical mis-specifications ignoring these constraints can lead to serious errors (a) in 
diagnosis of the problems facing poor rural people and (b) in policy and other prescriptions to address 
these problems.  
The remainder of this paper demonstrates that 
• the standard farm household model as described by Sadoulet and de Janvry is easily extended 
to take account of seasonal finance constraints; 
• such extensions can provide valuable analytical and policy insights where significant numbers 
of farm households do face serious seasonal finance constraints; and 
• consequently ‘seasonal farm household models’ should be considered the standard default for 
modelling poor farm household behaviour in the absence of effective credit markets and 
routinely implemented unless it is demonstrated that they are not relevant to the research 
question being addressed. 
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  Dorward (2006), for example, shows widely differing responses to and welfare effects of maize price and wage 
rate changes for poor and less poor people, with backward sloping supply responses to maize prices and wages 
for the poorest households, as a result of seasonal credit constraints.  
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4. A formal farm household model allowing for seasonal credit market failures 
The introduction of seasonal finance market failures into algebraic models is conceptually simple, 
involving the separation of pre-harvest (growing season) from harvest and post-harvest variables for 
consumption,  income and leisure / household reproduction time  in the utility function, and a similar 
separation, with new seasonal capital and labour equations, for labour and capital allocations.   A 
minimalist standard seasonal farm household model
4
 can then be represented as  
Max U = u(C1, C2, V2, LR, HR)       (1, utility function) 
where  u is the household utility function with utility U determined by pre harvest and post harvest 
consumption (C1 and  C2), by value of post harvest cash and stocks (V2), and by harvest and pre harvest 
‘leisure’ and household reproduction time , or disutility of household labour, (LR and HR) 
such that  
LT = LO + LF + LR - LI        (2, pre-harvest labour) 
HT = HO + HF + HR - HI        (3, harvest labour) 
V1  =  V0 – p1C1  –VS  + VB  –  VF   – w1 LI + w1 LO    (4, pre-harvest capital) 
V2 =  V1 + p2(Y - C2) + (1+i) VS – (1+i)VB – w2 HI + w2 HO    (5, harvest capital) 
Y = y(LF, HF, VF, D)       (6, production function) 
where  LT = household pre-harvest labour supply; LO = hiring out of pre-harvest labour;  LF = on farm 
pre-harvest labour use; LI = hiring in of pre-harvest labour; HT, HO, HF, HR and HI defined as for LT, LO, LF, 
LR and LI  but for harvest labour; V0 = value of pre-seasonal  cash and stocks (working capital); V1 = carry 
forward of pre-harvest cash and stocks;  w = wages for labour hire; VF = pre-harvest on-farm 
investment of working capital; VS = pre-harvest savings/ lending of working capital at interest rate i; VB 
= pre-harvest borrowing of working capital; p1 and  p2  =  respectively pre-harvest and harvest prices of 
farm produce and purchased commodities ; and Y is harvest time production expressed as a 
production function y of pre-harvest and harvest farm labour use, pre-harvest on-farm investment of 
                                                          
4
 The model follows de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) in using a static annual model and considering production, 
consumption and income use in different periods as different commodities. It is similar in many ways to those 
presented by Skoufias (1993), Petrick, M. (2004) and Dorward (2006), but with two time periods (as in Petrick, M. 
(2004)), with the ‘pre-harvest’ period including planting and growing.  
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working capital and land use (D). Note that where there are credit market failures then the value of VB 
may be constrained.  
It should be noted that the model can be extended in a number of ways, for example to allow seasonal 
and/or differential buying and selling wage rates and/or prices, further differentiation into more 
periods within the pre-harvest period, land rental, separation of farm and purchased consumption, 
and different farm production and off-farm activities (see for example Dorward (2006)). The standard 
farm household model presented by de Janvry and Sadoulet is a special case of the general seasonal 
farm household model presented above, where V0 is large relative to p1C1 and/or VB is unconstrained 
and i is low such that equation 4 does not constrain equations 5 and 6, and equations 2 and 3 can 
consequently be conflated, as can equations 4 and 5, with removal of C1 from equation 1 and the 
simple summation of LR and HR in equation 1.  
The model in equations 1 to 6 should be amenable to econometric estimation from farm household 
data sets, subject to the normal difficulties of obtaining the necessary (reliable) data and of specifying 
and estimating tractable and appropriate functional forms. Examples of such models are, however, 
regrettably rare, Skoufias, 1993, being a significant exception. Incorporation of seasonal consumption 
objectives and constraints in programming models is much more common. Linear programming 
models generally represent pre-harvest consumption objectives and disutility of household labour use 
as constraints (to allow post harvest income maximisation in a linear objective function – see for 
example Holden (1993), Alwang and Siegel (1999), Dorward (2006)). However pre-harvest 
consumption and leisure/ household reproduction  objectives can also be explicitly built into the 
objective function, as, for example, with the use of a Stone-Geary utility function (for example 
Dorward (2006)).  
5. A conceptual model of seasonal credit market failure effects  
Graphical representations of household models can make the insights from these models more 
accessible to those not familiar with algebraic models or lacking the necessary skills to work with 
them. They do, however, require some familiarity with micro-economic use of indifference curves and 
production function analysis, and also require some simplification of underlying algebraic models.  We 
now develop a graphical representation of the model presented above and use it to investigate key 
relationships described by the model.  
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The separation of objectives, resources and constraints between two time periods in the seasonal farm 
household model presented above contains too many dimensions to be properly represented in 
simple graphical models. However important and insightful elements of the model’s application to 
situations can be presented graphically by (a) simplifying the objective function to conflate some of the 
variables that are treated separately in the algebraic analysis outlined above, and (b) identifying 
particular scenarios with different values for specific variables and presenting these in different 
graphs
5
.   
We begin by assuming that decisions on labour and capital allocations in the harvest period are 
separable from those in the pre-harvest period, given pre-harvest decisions allocating labour and 
capital to farm production. For poor households we further postulate that for poor households with 
low levels of pre-harvest consumption C1 there is effectively a lexicographic ordering that prioritises C1 
for immediate survival. We also ignore harvest labour and capital constraints, assuming that 
household labour is sufficient and/or easily replaced by hired labour without financing constraints.  
The problem can then be represented as follows: 
Max U = u(C1, Y, LR, Z)       (7, utility function) 
such that  
LT = LO + LF + LR - LI       (8, pre-harvest labour) 
V1  =  V0 – p1C1  –VS  + VB  –  VF   – w1 LI + w1 LO   (9, pre-harvest capital) 
Y = y(LF, VF, D)       (10, production function) 
VB <= VBMax       (11, pre harvest credit constraint) 
Z= V1 + VS(1+i) – VB(1+i);           (12, harvest capital) 
                                                          
5
 It should be stressed that the approach taken in this section is intended to show how important it is that 
standard policy oriented analysis with household models should take account of seasonality. It does not address 
seasonal risk and uncertainty (which also need more attention in standard policy oriented analysis) nor 
methodological issues important for researchers trying to identify which households face credit rationing due to 
risk constraints and/or supply constraints (as discussed, for example, in Petrick, M. (2005), and Boucher et al. 
(2009)).  
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where VBMax  is the maximum that credit rationed households can borrow, all variables are greater than 
or equal to zero and (HR, V2)= f(Y, Z, V1) for households with given HT.  
We then re-arrange equation 9 to give  
(V0 + VB) – (p1C1 + VF) =  (V1 + VS) – w1 (LO – LI)    (13) 
This shows that if pre-seasonal capital and pre-harvest borrowings (V0 + VB) are less than minimum 
pre-harvest consumption and farm input use (p1C1 + VF) then these must be financed by hiring out 
household labour  (with (LO – LI) greater than zero since pre-harvest lending and saving (V1 + VS) cannot 
be negative ).   
We follow standard graphical analysis of household models, examining the interactions between (a) 
indifference curves for pre-harvest leisure/ household reproduction time  LR against Total Value 
Product (TVP) curves of farm production Y and (b) costs and returns from hiring pre-harvest labour in 
our out. However, we add (c) the proviso that in the allocation of pre-harvest labour, priority is given, 
if necessary, to hiring out labour to ensure that pre-harvest consumption and farm input use (p1C1 + 
VF) can be provided for by pre-seasonal stocks, borrowing and pre-harvest labour earnings ((V0 + VB) + 
w1 (LO – LI), from equation 13). This allows the graphical representation to ignore C1 in (a) focussing 
only on Y and LR in equation 7 (Z can be ignored for poor households for whom it will normally be very 
small). 
Figure 1 shows the Total Value Product (TVP) curve (per ha) obtained from the use of pre-harvest 
labour for two farm-households which have identical characteristics apart from credit rationing.  Farm 
household A has insufficient pre-harvest capital resources (V0 +VBmax)
6
 to meet pre-harvest capital 
requirements for consumption and farm input use (p1C1 + VF), and therefore as specified in equation 
13, labour has to be hired out to meet the shortfall. The amount of labour needed depends upon the 
size of the shortfall and, as we shall see, upon the pre-harvest wage rate.  Farm household B has 
sufficient pre-harvest capital resources (V0 +VBmax)
7
 to meet pre-harvest capital requirements for 
consumption and farm input use (p1C1 + VF), and there is no need to hire labour out to cover any deficit 
and so the household has more freedom to apply labour to the farm or other activities.  
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 We assume that under these circumstances the household borrows up to the maximum available, VBmax. 
7
 The household may or may not need to borrow up to the maximum available, VBmax. 
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Figure 1. Total value product of pre-harvest labour for credit rationed and non-rationed households 
We now build on figure 1 to find utility maximising allocations of seasonal working capital to food 
consumption and production. Figure 2 therefore adds indifference curves describing the trade-offs 
between the dis-utility of allocating labour to working on and off farm,  rather than leisure and 
household reproduction, (on the horizontal axis) against benefits from farm production (on the vertical 
axis) 
8
.  Figure 2 shows utility maximising allocations of seasonal working capital to food consumption 
and production for both household types
9
. Family labour allocations to different activities and (for 
farm household B) on-farm hired labour use are summarised in a panel at the top of each graph.  
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 As in standard graphical analysis of farm household models, conventional indifference curves are rotated 90
o
 
anticlockwise.  
9
 It is assumed for simple exposition that farm technology and input use are identical across the two farm 
households, and that purchasing and sales prices are the same, as are net wages for hiring in and out. Variation 
in input use and transaction costs leading to buying and selling price differences can easily be introduced. 
Variations in household member wage potentials could also be introduced (as with Low (1986)) with lowest 
earners working on farm tasks where farm MVP is higher than wages, and high wage earners applying labour first 
to C1 earnings (this would provide an additional explanation to Low’s analysis of off farm employment) and then 
to further earnings.  
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Since farm-household type A has to hire out labour (LO) to cover its pre-harvest capital deficit, there is 
less household labour available for on farm production (as shown in figure 1). This means that despite 
high marginal returns to labour, only a low level of welfare is achieved (as shown by the TVP/ 
indifference curve tangency at an indifference curve IA  which is relatively close to the LT and zero 
production lines .  Farm household B has no need to hire labour out to cover any deficit and so can 
apply more labour to the farm – and indeed with sufficient  capital can apply some of this to hiring 
labour in, as shown in figure 2.  If this is the case it reduces the amount of family labour applied to the 
farm (LF) and achieves the indifference curve IB  which is much further from the LT and zero production 
lines than is the case for indifference curve IA  for farm household A
10
.   
TVP
w
Hire out LO Farm 
LF
Other
Farm A: Credit rationed
p1C1+VF
Pre harvest 
labour /ha
LTLO
IA
LF
V0+VBmax
TVP
w
Farm 
LF Hire in LI
Other
Farm B: Not credit rationed
IB
Pre harvest 
labour /ha
LTLILF
(p1C1 + VF) <= (V0 + VBmax)
IBB
0 0
Production (Y) /ha
Pre-harvest consumption (C1) /ha
Production (Y) /ha
Pre-harvest consumption (C1) /ha
w
 
Figure 2. Utility maximising labour allocations & production by household type (per ha) 
This analysis is clearly different from standard farm household analysis as it shows that allowance for 
credit rationing can lead to substantial differences in farm household welfare, farm production, and 
labour market engagement from that predicted by the standard farm household model, implicitly 
without credit rationing, in otherwise identical farm households. A specific prediction is that relaxation 
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 The diagram for Farm B in figure 2 also shows the indifference curve IBB which could be achieved if there was 
not enough capital to hire in labour. This gives lower welfare than indifference curve IB but welfare that is still 
considerably higher than from indifference curve IA on farm A.  
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of working capital constraints can lead to reduced hiring out of labour, a specific impact of cash 
transfers reported in Malawi by Covarrubias et al. (2012)
11
.  
Welfare and behavioural difference between this analysis and standard farm household analysis 
become more pronounced when we examine farm household responses to and welfare effects of 
exogenous changes. It is these differences, we suggest, that mean that standard farm household 
analysis that ignores seasonal credit rationing constraints can be highly misleading when examining 
the effects of change on poor farm households.  
6. Analysing wage changes, output price changes and investments in new technology  
We now examine four types of change and their impacts on the two different household types: in 
wages, in farm output prices, and in unsubsidised and subsidised investments in new technology.  
6.1.  Analysing wage and output price changes  
Changes in wages are represented graphically  with a wage fall (represented by a shallower slope for 
the wage line, w’1 replacing w1). Figure 3 shows the impacts of falling wages on the two households’ 
labour allocations, production, and welfare. These are summarised in table 2.   
Table 2. Impacts of fall in wages on households with and without credit rationing  
Farm/hh type 
Wage fall effects 
Labour Hire 
Production Welfare 
In Out 
A: credit rationed N/A + - - 
B: not credit rationed  + N/A + + 
                                                          
11
 Covarrubias et al. (2012) report a drop of 61% in low skilled agricultural wage activities for poor farm 
households receiving unconditional cash transfers.  
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Figure 3. Impacts of rise in output prices or fall in wages 
For farm household B (not constrained by seasonal capital constraints) the analysis is again identical to 
that of a standard farm household model, as higher production and welfare are achieved with 
increased hiring in of labour and leisure/ household reproduction time but reduced on farm family 
labour use (as shown by the panels at the top of the graph). However for farm household A, with 
serious credit rationing constraints, the analysis and impacts are quite different. The fall in returns to 
hiring out labour means that more labour has to be used to earn enough to make up the pre-harvest 
working capital deficit between available pre-harvest working capital and that required for 
consumption and farm input purchases ((p1C1 + VF) – (V0 + VB)). As a result less labour is available for 
farm production, shifting the TVP curve to the right. The result is that a fall in wages for these 
households leads not only to reductions in welfare (with TVP/ indifference curve tangency at an 
indifference curve below the previous indifference curve) but a rise in hiring out of labour and a fall in 
production, with a backward sloping supply curve for labour.   
The effects of a rise in food staple output price can be examined using a similar analysis if the vertical 
axis in figure 3 is measured using real prices expressed in equivalent physical units of staple food 
output.  A rise in the price of staples leads to a fall in the value of wages relative to (a) the pre-harvest 
ability of hired out labour to buy staples and (b) the value of harvest and post-harvest staple 
14 
 
production. The former will differ between households according to the proportion of the pre-harvest 
working capital deficit ((p1C1 + VF) – (V0 + VB)) required for staple food purchases. This proportion will 
tend to be higher for poorer households as (a) poorer people spend a greater proportion of their 
income on food, and (b) the analysis above suggests that more credit rationed farm households (who 
are likely to be poorer) are likely to produce and hence store less staple food.  Thus, for example, for a 
household for whom 50% of their working capital deficit was accounted for by staple food purchases 
prior to any price change, a 100% staple food price rise will lead, ceteris paribus,  to a 50% increase in 
the amount of hired out labour needed to finance their pre-harvest working capital deficit
12
. For such 
households, therefore, a rise in the price of staple foods leads to a reduction in the labour available for 
their production and again a backward sloping supply curve or forward sloping demand curve
13
.  This 
analysis is consistent with results from non-linear programming models reported in Dorward (2006) for 
different types of household in Malawi. 
6.2.  Analysing unsubsidised and subsidised investments in new technology  
A change in technology is most simply represented graphically by an upward, anti-clockwise swivelling 
of the TVP curve in the analysis for each household. If this requires no extra labour or other capital 
investments prior to harvest then there are limited differences in outcomes from analysis with the 
standard farm household model: production and welfare achievements increase across all households 
and hired labour demand increases for household B. This applies only if direct and immediate 
household impacts are considered, with no consideration of consequent wider market impacts beyond 
the household. If these market effects are considered then the increased production and demand for 
labour should exert pressures that depress produce prices and/or increase wages (if these markets are 
to some extent separated from wider markets), and as shown above the impacts of these will be 
different where seasonal finance constraints are considered – with particular benefits for poorer 
households.  
                                                          
12
 More generally, (L’O-LO)/L O = bd where (L’O-LO)/L O is percentage increase in hired out labour needed to finance 
the working capital deficit, b is the proportion of working capital deficit accounted for by staple food purchases 
before the price change, and d is the percentage increase in the price of the staple food.  
13
 Strictly speaking such households are food deficit producers so that the staple food price rise leads to a 
reduction in production and an increase in purchases of food staples in the subsequent year, and hence a 
backward sloping production response and, in terms of market interactions, an equally anomalous forward 
sloping demand curve.  
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This analysis is however changed if the new technology requires some initial investment in, for 
example, extra or more costly labour, seed or fertiliser. This can be represented in the diagrams used 
here by an increase in input purchases and hence in pre-harvest capital requirements if the technology 
is adopted (p1C1 + V’F). For household A this would require more hiring out of labour to provide this 
pre-harvest capital. The steeper TVP curve (TVP’) therefore starts from a position to the right of the 
original TVP curve. The welfare effects of adoption are then determined by the relative positions of the 
new TVP curve (dependent upon the increase in hired out labour required to finance increased pre-
harvest investment and the increase in labour productivity) and the indifference curves. 
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Figure 4 Impacts of new technology requiring seasonal investment, no subsidy  
 As drawn for household A in figure 4, investment in new technology leads to a lower welfare 
(tangency with a lower indifference curve I’A), and the new technology will therefore not be adopted. 
For household B, however, the new technology allows achievement of a higher indifference curve I’B 
and should therefore be adopted. Increased hired labour demand and higher production should lead 
to lower output prices and higher local wages (if these markets are to some extent separated from 
wider markets and if there are sufficient numbers of producers able to adopt the new technology) with 
subsequent benefits to poorer households unable to adopt the new technology.  An important point to 
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note in this is the way that credit rationing can explain variation between otherwise similar households  
as regards their technology choices and productivity.   
We now investigate the impacts of a subsidy that reduces the seasonal working capital requirements 
for the new technology. A partial subsidy is assumed that substantially reduces, but does not 
eliminate, the cost of inputs such as seed or fertiliser. The analysis is shown in figure 5 for farm 
household A only, since farm household B would invest in the new technology anyway, without a 
subsidy.  
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Figure 5 Impacts of new technology requiring seasonal investment, with subsidy 
The subsidy leads to a reduction in seasonal working capital needed for farm input purchase with the 
new technology and hence less hiring out of labour with a smaller rightward movement of the TVP 
curve (compare L’O and TVP’ in figure 4 with L’’O and TVP’’ in figure 5). The result is that with the 
subsidy the new technology allows farm household A to achieve higher production and a higher 
indifference curve (I’’A) and hence welfare than they would without adopting the new technology. This 
result depends upon the size and nature of the subsidy and the characteristics of the new technology 
and its impact on land and labour productivity. If the subsidy is rationed and targeted, then subsidy 
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recipients may also be able to sell some of their subsidised inputs, increasing their seasonal working 
capital and allowing them to invest their retained inputs without the need for any increased hiring out 
of labour.  The likelihood of changes in labour and produce demand and supply should again lead to 
lower output prices and higher local wages benefiting poorer households, if these markets are to some 
extent separated from wider markets. However as compared with the unsubsidised situation, price 
and wage changes could be more marked if there are large numbers of subsidy beneficiaries, as output 
and labour market effects should be greater
14
.   
The analysis presented here is consistent with results from modelling and from preliminary analysis of 
field surveys investigating the impacts on different household types in different areas of the 2005/6 to 
2008/9 large scale agricultural input subsidy programme in Malawi (School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al. (2008), Dorward and Chirwa (2009)).  It also supports emerging arguments regarding the 
importance of the role of subsidies in promoting the affordability of inputs rather than just their 
profitability, which has in the past been the dominant focus of most discussions on the role of 
agricultural input subsidies (Dorward (2009)).  
7. Conclusions 
The stylised findings presented in this paper show that representing the credit rationing effects of 
seasonal finance market failures in theoretical and empirical farm household models can lead to 
important differences in our understanding of the impacts of different changes on poor rural people 
and of the markets in which they participate (or fail to participate). The extent and importance of 
these difficulties will depend upon the extent and nature of seasonal finance constraints affecting rural 
people in different areas, the numbers of people affected, and the particular interactions of labour and 
produce markets with utility and production functions. There are a number of further issues not 
addressed in the simple graphical analysis presented here, but amenable to quantitative analysis, such 
as the impacts of inter and intra-seasonal wage and price variation, and of  different crop and crop 
technology options.  
                                                          
14
 Output price effects may also be dampened somewhat if the profit effect increases staple food consumption 
(as in equation 1) but wage effects may also be heightened if increased real incomes increase demand for non-
tradable goods and services. Falling output prices and rising wages should themselves also lead to positive 
impacts on poorer households’ welfare in subsequent seasons (as discussed earlier) and thus raise the possibility 
of a virtuous circle of growth. 
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The approach developed in this paper for representing seasonal finance market failures in farm 
household models suggests that there are no pressing methodological reasons for the widespread 
failure to examine seasonal finance constraints on poor farm households’ behaviour and welfare in 
standard farm household analysis. We then must ask why seasonal finance market failures are so often 
overlooked in empirical models.  
Two basic reasons may be postulated, first that many (most) analysts have not considered them 
sufficiently important, and second that data sets have not contained the variables needed for 
estimation of such models. Since analysts have an important role in specifying the variables included in 
data sets, analysts’ lack of interest in seasonal finance constraints would appear to be the major 
reason for the absence of models allowing for these constraints. If this is a self perpetuating blind spot  
then analysts must first recognise it and then adjust their data collection, modelling and analysis 
activities to allow for these constraints as a standard part of farm household analysis, not only in 
models specifically investigating seasonal credit.  
Inclusions of seasonal finance constraints in more accessible graphical representations of farm 
household models may be one approach to addressing analysts’ lack of attention to these constraints 
in standard empirical models, if analysis of such representations can demonstrate the importance of 
these constraints as critical for understanding poor rural people’s behaviour and welfare.  The 
examples presented do indeed demonstrate this importance.  Analysts, teachers and students in rural 
development economics should therefore recognise that simpler models without explicit 
representation of seasonal finance constraints should not be adopted as the norm. They should only 
be adopted as a special case of the general model in those situations where households’ initial working 
capital (for finance and production) and/or their access to financial markets do not significantly or 
unduly distort farm household behaviour and outcomes from what would prevail with improved 
access to functional financial markets.  This cannot be taken as the norm, particularly where analysis is 
concerned with the welfare and behaviour of poorer households.  
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